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Abstract 
Contractual incompleteness is generally defined by a trade-off between costs and benefits. We examine this trade-off 
in a dynamic setting and show how the ability of the parties to sustain a relational contract leads to more incomplete 
contracts.
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1. Introduction
Observed contracts are rarely complete in the Arrow Debreu sense. The main
reason is that writing complete agreements is costly, and there is a trade-o between
these costs and the gains to avoid contractual incompleteness and potential ex post
oppotunism (Crockers and Reynolds (1993), Battigalli and Maggi (2008)). In this
paper, we would like to investigate what happens to this trade-o when parties trade
repeatedly. Empirical studies provide various evidence: some contracts become more
and more complete over time (Crockers and Reynolds (1993)) and some others are
more and more incomplete (Corts and Singh (2004)). We propose here a short
model showing that the level of contractual (in)completeness depends on the ability
to sustain relational contracts in a dynamic setting. Relational contracts are infor-
mal commitments governing non-contractible actions and sustained by the value of
future transactions (Bull (1987), Baker et al. (2002)). When the discounted payo
stream from commitment to this informal agreement is higher than the discounted
payo stream from deviation, a relational contract is sustainable and allows to avoid
ex post opportunism. Our model shows that in this situation, there is no need to
make formal contracts as complete as possible, so that investment in contractual
completeness should be lower. This result contributes to the literature on endoge-
nous contractual incompleteness.1 It can be related to Tirole (2009) that focus
on what drives equilibrium transaction costs when parties have bounded rationality.
The role of relational contracts as a factor of contractual incompleteness is suggested
in this paper, but as far as we know, our paper is the rst model that formally ex-
plores such a causality. Only Bernheim and Whinston (1998) have explored the
links between incomplete contracts and relational contracts. They regard contrac-
tual incompleteness as a cause and not a consequence of relational contracts, since
punishment strategies allowing a relational contract to be sustainable can be more
easily elaborated when contracts are incomplete. Our contribution is to formally
show the reverse causality: incomplete contracts are not a cause but a consequence
of relational contracts. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
describes our theoretical framework. In section 3, we describe the result under a
static framework. Section 4 shows how relational contracting leads to contractual
incompleteness in a dynamic framework. Section 5 concludes.
2. The theoretical framework
2.1 Agents and contractual design
We consider a repeated bilateral contractual relationship between a buyer (B,
whom we refer as \he") and a seller (S, whom we refer as \she"). The buyer wishes
a project or a service, and asks the seller to perform the work according to his
specications, i.e. according to the contractual design. The value of the project is
K+ for the buyer and the seller executes the contract at cost c.2 The contract is a
1See Kornhauser and Macleod (2010) for a survey about this literature.
2Both K+ and c are common knowledge.
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cost-plus contract, so that the seller is paid a price P = c +  where  (> 0) is the
additional compensation beyond the reimbursement of the cost.
As in Bajari and Tadelis (2001), we focus here on problems of ex post adaptations in
a context where the level of contractual incompleteness is endogenously determined.
More precisely, we consider that both parties share uncertainty about contingencies
that may arise once the contract is signed and the production begins.3 Then, during
the execution of the contract, some adaptations may be needed to reach K+ because
the contractual design proved to be inappropriate. In this situation, the contract is
said to be incomplete because some actions to reach K+ were not foreseen ex ante.
The parties have then to renegotiate the contract.
2.2 Contingencies
Before proposing the contract, B may perform some costly non-observable eorts
to learn about future contingencies, which allows him to propose a more or less
appropriate contractual design. As in Tirole (2009), these additional costly eorts
incurred before the signature of the contract allow the buyer to determine ex ante
what may go wrong ex post and to draft the contract accordingly. Then, those costs
determine the level of (in)completeness.
We denote k(2 [0;1[) the intensity of the eort made by the buyer (at each period)
to learn about future contingencies.4 The higher the intensity of the eort, the more
complete the proposed contract will be.5 Then, by investing k 2 [0;1[:
￿ With probability (k), the proposed design (called design A) is the appropri-
ate design. Then, the contract is considered as \complete", because eveything
happens as foreseen ex ante. The contract delivers utility K+ for B and costs
the seller c to produce (K+ > c > 0). As a consequence, the utility of the
buyer is V = K+   P, and that of the seller is U = P   c = . Hence, the
total surplus is K+   c.
￿ But, with probability 1 (k), the design is inappropriate and only delivers
K , with K  = K+    where  > 0. In this case, we consider the contract
as incomplete because unforeseen contingencies prevent from reaching K+,
and parties need to renegotiate their agreement. Indeed, some other, initially
unknown, design A0 delivers utility K+ to B. Converting A into A0 implies
contract's modications, that cost \a" to B. We assume that these costs are
distributed over [a;a] with (0 < a < a < ) according to a probability density
function z(a), and the average value of a is denoted ~ a. The buyer knows this
3The seller has no private information about the occurrence of unforeseen contingencies that
could arise. See Bajari and Tadelis (2001) to justify this concern for ex post adaptation in pub-
lic procurement. An illustration of such ex post adaptation can also be found in Macleod and
Chakravarty (2009) about the construction of the Getty museum in Los Angeles.
4Since only the buyer may suer from hold-up in our setting, he is the only party to invest to
make the contract more complete.
5We speak interchangeably of k as an eort or an investment in contractual completeness.
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distribution.6 Then, net gains from renegotiations are    a.7 Moreover, the
seller can decide to hold-up the buyer during the renegotiation process, i.e. she
grabs a part h of the net gains of renegotiation. We assume that the seller has
an ex post bargaining power  2 [0;1], so that h = ( a). As a consequence,
the level of hold-up is distributed over [h;h] (with 0 < h < h) according to the
same probability distribution as a.
The function (k) is smooth, increasing, concave, and dened on [0;1[ so that (0) =
0, 0(0) = 0, 0(k) > 0, 00(k) < 0, limk!1 (k) = 1.
Figure 1: Timing of the game for one contractual period
B proposes a contract 




at cost c 
If A is not appropriate, 
either S hold-up or S 
adjusts herself without 
hold-up 




2.3 First-Best level of investments in contractual completeness
Let us determine here the optimal level of investments in contractual complete-





+   c) + (1   (k))(K






The optimal investment is that ~ a0(k) = 1: the marginal benet of the investment
equals its marginal expected cost.
3. The static game
Let us rst suppose that B and S meet only once. Using backward induction, we
can easily see that whenever ex post adaptations are needed, S decides to hold-up









~ a + ~ h
(2)
By comparing the rst-order conditions (1) and (2), and because of the concavity
of the function (:), 0(kNE) < 0(k) ) kNE > k: B over-invests in contractual
completeness compared to the optimal level of investment.
6We can assume that the seller also knows this distribution, even if it has no consequence, since
she does not bear the cost of these costs of ex post adaptation.
7We assume that trade is ecient, i.e. 8k;a;K+   c   (1   (k))a > 0.
8The superscript \NE" stands for \Nash Equilibrium".
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Proposition 1. Under a static game, the contract signed between a buyer and
a seller is too complete compared to the socially ecient level of completeness.
4. The repeated game
4.1 The dynamic environment
We now consider that the buyer and the seller trade repeatedly. The parties
have dierent discount rates, B 2 (0;1) for the buyer, and S 2 (0;1) for the seller.
These discount rates remain the same for all periods, and are known by the parties.9
At each end of a period, the buyer can decide to renew the seller or not. We assume
that there is no outside option for the seller if the relationship ends, while the buyer
can pursuit the game with another seller but returns to the Nash Equilibrium level
of investment in contractual completeness kNE.
8t 2 N, we denote kt 2 [0;1[ the intensity of the eort made by the buyer to
learn about future contingencies in period t. Since the environment changes over
the periods, this eort is specic to each period. Then, at each period t, the design
is appropriate with probability (kt), and inappropriate with probability 1   (kt).
To sum up, at each period of the game, the buyer has to decide the level of eort kt,
while the seller has decide not to hold-up or to hold-up in case of ex post adaptations,
where dt = f0;1g denotes this decision. The per-period payo of the buyer is
E(Vt) = K+   P   (1   (kt))(at + dtht)   kt and that of the seller is E(Ut) =
P   c + (1   (kt))(dtht).
4.2 The relational contract
We assume that B can propose an informal agreement (i.e. a relational contract)
to S and asks her not to hold-up in the case of unforeseen ex post adjustments.
This allows him to save on eort kt. If S cooperates, B promises to renew her
with probability 1 at time t+1. Conversely, if S deviates, B threatens to choose
another seller at the next period. If the relational contract is sustainable by both















In other words, at equilibrium, the level of investment is optimal: kRC = k.10 The
expected payo of the seller is E(URC) = P   c =  since the seller never holds up.
Let us now see whether such a relational contract can be implemented.
9We explore the consequences of asymmetric information on the discount rates in Desrieux and
Beuve (2011).
10This is a stationary equilibrium: 8t  1, kt = kRC.
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4.3 The participation and self-enforcement constraints of the buyer
The buyer proposes a relational contract only if his expected payo under rela-
tional contracting is higher than under Nash Equilibrium, i.e. if E(V RC) > E(V NE):
, K
+   P   (1   (k
RC))~ a   k
RC > K
+   P   (1   (k




RC + (1   (k
NE))~ h > ((k
NE)   (k
RC))~ a (PCB)
The left-hand side of (PCB) represents the gains of the buyer thanks to the rela-
tional contracts: he saves on investments in contractual completeness (kNE   kRC)
and on potential hold-up ((1   (kNE))~ h). The right-hand side of this equation
represents the higher cost of contractual modication the buyer is likely to support:
because contracts are more incomplete, he will have to nance more frequently the
adaptation cost \a". Whenever (PCB) holds, the buyer has better propose a rela-
tional contract to the seller than choose to over-invest in contractual completeness.
Let us now pinpoint the self-enforcement constraint of the buyer (SEB), i.e. the
conditions under which he respects his informal commitment. In case of deviation,
he does not renew S and invests the Nash equilibrium level of investment (with












When (PCB) binds so that E(V RC)  E(V NE), then equation (SEB) never
holds: the buyer commits to his informal promise.
Lemma 1. When the participation constraint of the buyer holds, a relational
contract threatening not to renew the seller in case of hold-up is sustainable by the
buyer and allows him to invest k, whatever his discount rate B 2 (0;1).
4.4 The self-enforcement constraint of the seller
The self-enforcement constraint of the seller (SES) implies that her payo stream














Denition 1. We dene  = h
+h as the discount rate above which the relational
contract is sustainable for the seller even for the highest value of hold-up (h) and
 =
h
+h as the discount rate below which the relational contract is never sustainable,
i.e. deviation is more protable even for h.
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Following denition 1 and (SES), we can distinguish three seller types: H when
S > , L when S < , and M when S 2 [;].
Lemma 2.
￿ The type H seller never deviates since her self-enforcement constraint (SES)
always holds. The relational contract is sustainable.
￿ The type L seller always deviates, since deviation is preferable for her even
when the smallest amount of hold-up occurs. The SES never holds.
￿ There is a level of hold-up hM
d 2 [h;h] above which the type M seller prefers to







(SES) only holds on [h; hM
d ].
4.4 Investment in contractual completeness
From lemma (1) and lemma (2):
￿ With a type H seller, the relational contract is self-enforced for both the buyer
and the seller. The investment in contractual completeness is kRC = k.
￿ With a type L seller, the SES never binds. No relational contract can be
implemented, and the buyer has to invest kNE if he trades with this seller.
￿ If the seller is of type M, the self-enforcement constraint only binds up to a
value hM
d 2 [h;h]. As a consequence, the relational contract is not sustainable
for all the values of h, i.e. for all value of a. However, under some condi-
tions, the buyer may propose a\second-best relational contract"to the type M
seller that allows him to save on the investment in contractual completeness,
even if he still over-invests. Let us detail below such a second-best relational
contract.11
A type M seller holds up whenever h  hM
d . Since h = (   a), we denote aM
the level of the modication cost a corresponding to hM




whenever a 2 [a;aM], the relational contract is no longer sustainable for the type M
seller. However, the buyer may still ask the seller not to hold-up and promises him
to get an extra bonus when a 2 [a;aM] if no hold-up occurs. This bonus is an ex
ante predetermined payment that depends on the level of a in case of inappropriate
contractual design.12 We denote b(a)  0 this bonus. Under such a second-best
11This second-best relational contract is only proposed to type M sellers. Contrary to Desrieux
and Beuve (2011), information is symmetric, then there is no strategic behavior from the sellers.
12Recall that a is observable by both parties, even if it is non-contractible.
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relational contract, the payos of the buyer and the type M seller are respectively:
E(V
SRC) = K
+   P   (1   (k











where kSRC denotes the level of investment in contractual completeness when the
second-best relational contract holds.





By comparing with (1) and (2), we obtain kRC = k  kSRC  kNE.
Proof 2 in the appendix shows that the second-best relational contract is
sustainable when:











￿ With a type H seller, the buyer's investment in contractual completeness is at
the optimal level k since a relational contract threatening not to renew the
seller in case of hold-up is sustainable by both parties.
￿ With a type L seller, no relational contract is sustainable and the buyer still
overinvests in contractual completeness (kNE) if he trades with the seller.
￿ Under some conditions, a second-best relational contract can be implemented
between the buyer and a type M seller. It allows the buyer to invest kSRC so
that k < kSRC  kNE.
5. Conclusion
In this article, we examine how relational contracting determines the level of con-
tractual incompleteness: whenever the buyer anticipates that a relational agreement
is sustainable, he knows that he will not be held up, and so invests less in ex ante
contractual completeness. This allows him to avoid contractual over-completeness
observed under a static framework. Our results contribute to the literature on en-
dogenous contractual incompleteness, by stressing another determinant of incom-
pleteness. They also suggest that the identity of the parties matters when they
contract, so that an identical transaction can entail dierent contracting costs (in
completeness) depending on the contracting parties involved.
7
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Appendix
Proof 1.
Under a second-best relational contract, the payo of the buyer when he trades
with a type M seller is
E(V
SRC) = K





















~ a + (
R aM
a b(a)z(a)da)
If the second-best relational contract is sustainable, the payo of the seller is




Let us now determine the conditions under which this second-best relational
contract is sustainable.
The participation constraint of the buyer:
For the buyer to propose a second-best relational contract, his payo has to be






NE)  0 (PCB2)
The self-enforcement constraint of the buyer:
The buyer commits to this second-best relational contract when he has better
give the bonus b(a) (when a 2 [a;aM]) than renege and then invests kNE in the
following periods. Then, his self-enforcement constraint (SEB2) is:
8a 2 [a;aM],
K
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NE)  0 , (PCB2)
To sum up, the buyer can propose a second-best relational contract to a type M
seller. This informal agreement foresees to give an extra bonus b(a) when a 2 [a;aM]
if the seller does not hold up. The buyer proposes and commits to this informal
agreement if the bonus b(a) never exceeds bmax = (E(V SRC)   E(V NE))
B
1 B.
The highest bonus he has to give occurs when a = a, since it implies h =  h.13.
In other words, a second best relational contract to be sustainable for the buyer if
b(a)  (E(V SRC)   E(V NE))
B
1 B.
The self-enforcement constraint of the type M seller (SES2):
8a 2 [a;aM],




 P   c + h




 P   c + (   a)





A type-M seller committs to the second-best relational contract if he gets a minimal
extra bonus b(a) = (   a)   E(USRC)
S
1 S whenever a 2 [a;aM].
To sum up, a second-best relational contract that foresees to give to the seller
an extra bonus b(a)14 whenever a 2 [a;aM] can be sustained between a buyer and a
type M seller if:










13Recall that 8a, h = (   a)




a b(a)z(a)da) = (   a)   S
1 S(P   c).
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